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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professor Felix Cohen once said that one of the only two significant questions in 
the field of law is “how do courts actually decide cases of a given kind?”1  The 
answer to Professor Cohen’s question is the focus of my project.  More precisely, my 
project is principally concerned with how judges do not decide cases. 
Presumably, judicial resolution turns upon finding or deciding what the proper 
rule of law is or should be.  This, in turn, provokes the question of how one 
determines what the proper rule of law is for any given case.   
One method of grappling with this question is to find proper guidelines (or better 
yet, rules) that will aid judges in finding the, or a, correct rule of law.  Such rules I 
call “meta-rules.”  That is, they are rules used to decide what the rule of law is, or 
should be, in any given case.  Such rules can also be called “rules of interpretation.”  
I will use the terms “meta-rules” and “rules of interpretation” interchangeably to 
signify rules used to determine what the appropriate rule of law is or should be. 
This article deals with constitutional hermeneutics.  Hermeneutics is the art or 
theory of interpretation.2  Deciding what the constitutionally appropriate rule is in 
any given case hinges on what methods any particular judge utilizes to interpret the 
Constitution.  Constitutional hermeneutics, then, is the theory of constitutional 
interpretation.  In this paper, I address a specific constitutional hermeneutic: 
textualism-originalism.3 
This article is a critique of the constitutional hermeneutic of textualism-
originalism.  As such, my thesis is that the model of interpretation embodied by 
textualism-originalism cannot possibly serve to do what its proponents assert it does: 
constrain judicial interpretation.4  This is because textualism-originalism depends on 
two seemingly innocuous premises: (1) rules, including meta-rules, are determinate 
(that is, rules can determine outcomes in and of themselves); and (2) rules of 
interpretation exist antecedent to a judge’s application of that rule. 
This article seeks to challenge these premises.  The means for this challenge is 
the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, supplemented by the analysis of several 
legal pragmatists: John Dewey, William James, and Chief Judge Richard Posner.  
My thesis is two-pronged: (1) because meta-rules, like any other rules, are 
indeterminate, the picture of constitutional interpretation that relies on meta-rules to 
constrain judicial discretion is mistaken, and (2) assuming arguendo that 
Wittgenstein’s analysis shows that rules are actually determinate, the efficacy of 
textualism-originalism is still not preserved because meta-rules do not exist 
                                                                
1 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 824 (1935). 
2 THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 323 (2d ed. 1995). 
3 Insofar as the chief purpose of textualism and originalism is the same—to properly 
constrain a judge’s constitutional interpretations such that they do not impermissibly become 
what the judge thinks the Constitution ought or ought not provide—I will generally treat them 
as constituents of the same functional hermeneutic unit and refer to them singularly as 
“textualism-originalism” throughout this article.   
4 See discussion infra Part III.  The raison d’etre of textualism is judicial minimalism—to 
prevent judges from deciding cases according to their own predilections rather than on the 
law. 
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antecedent to the question presented in any individual case.  The first premise seems 
a stronger claim to me insofar as it challenges the determinacy and meaning of all 
rules.  Accordingly, I will call the first argument the “strong thesis” and the second 
argument the “weak thesis.” 
In Part II of this article, I trace a traditional model of legal rule-following.  Part 
III illustrates how textualism-originalism follows this traditional model.  Part IV, the 
meat of this paper, analyzes and critiques textualism-originalism utilizing the 
philosophies of Wittgenstein and Kripke.  Finally, Dewey’s analysis provides the 
transition into Part V, which concludes with my answer to Professor Cohen’s 
question—my perspective on how judges actually decide cases. 
Before proceeding, I would like to make several points about my use of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  First, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is extremely 
controversial.5  There is serious debate in the philosophical community about the  
precise meaning of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.6  I admittedly present a view of 
Wittgenstein’s work that is by no means widely accepted.  I present it not as settled 
doctrine, but as one view among many of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.7 
Second, I view Wittgenstein’s project as negative.  “What [Wittgenstein] opposes 
to the misunderstandings and false pictures that he examines is not an alternative 
explanation . . . . ”8  I do not view Wittgenstein as providing any model of rule-
following in lieu of the model he rejects.9  In critiquing textualism-originalism, I 
follow what I perceive to be Wittgenstein’s lead. As such, I do not pretend to have 
any idea what the correct method of interpreting the Constitution is, nor do I 
explicate any such theory.  I do not know the correct method of constitutional 
                                                                
5 MARIE MCGINN, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1 (1997) 
(“[T]he philosophical responses to [Wittgenstein’s] work present no . . . coherent picture, but 
rather display wide discrepancies in both the interpretation and assessment of his work.”). 
6 See id.; Brian Bix, The Application (and Mis-Application) of Wittgenstein's Rule-
Following Considerations to Legal Theory, 3 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 107, 108 n.10 (1990) (“One 
note of caution: Wittgenstein's ideas in the Philosophical Investigations, including the material 
on rule-following, is presented in short passages, which are often aphoristic or cryptic.  To 
read a particular argument or viewpoint into these comments requires an implicit or explicit 
filling out of details and clarification of ambiguities.”). 
7 Part IV also examines in detail an alternate interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy.  In fact, the second prong of my thesis accepts the alternate view arguendo, and 
proceeds to show it cannot save textualism and originalism. 
8 MCGINN, supra note 5, at 21. 
9 Of course, this view is hardly settled.  The alternate interpretation of Wittgenstein I 
examine does tend to find a positive model of rule-following in his work.  Though I recognize 
this perspective, I disagree with it.  Cf.  Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and The Code: A 
Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
335, 354 (1988) (“[T]he particular virtues of the Wittgensteinian approach to problems of 
meaning can be measured only by the degree to which the approach succeeds . . . .”).  In any 
case, in Part IV, I assume arguendo that Wittgenstein does espouse a positive model of rule-
following, and deny its ability to preserve the utility of textualism and originalism.  
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interpretation.  Indeed, I doubt there is any correct method.  This paper simply 
attempts to identify some incorrect methods and explain why they are fallacious.10 
II.  THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF LEGAL RULE-FOLLOWING 
Essentially, the traditional model of legal rule-following is known as “legal 
formalism.”  It is so named because the traditional model can be depicted by the 
formula: rule → facts → decision. 
The formula has its roots in the logic of the syllogism.  A syllogism, as countless 
authors have explained ad nauseum, consists of a major premise, a minor premise, 
and a conclusion.11  The classic syllogism obeys the following form: if A and if B 
then C, such that if “all men are mortal, and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is 
mortal.” 
The syllogism is perhaps the touchstone of modern legal method.12  “So 
compelling and familiar is syllogistic reasoning that lawyers and judges try hard to 
make legal reasoning seem syllogistic.”13  John Dewey described the operation of the 
syllogism 
as the model of all proof or demonstration.  It implies that what we need 
and must procure is first a fixed general principle, the so-called major 
premise, such as ‘all men are mortal;’ then in the second place, a fact 
which belongs intrinsically and obviously to a class of things to which the 
general principle applies: Socrates is a man.  Then the conclusion 
automatically follows: Socrates is mortal.  According to this model every 
demonstrative or strictly logical conclusion ‘subsumes’ a particular under 
an appropriate universal.  It implies the prior and given existence of 
particular and universals.14 
Dewey’s analysis, while a fair description, ought to be read in context of the critique 
of logical forms in law that is the subject of his paper.  To be sure, numerous 
scholars, including Dewey, critique the syllogism as it is used in legal method.  
Arguably, the most famous of these is the analysis of Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, epitomized in his classic aphorism, “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: 
it has been experience.”15 
                                                                
10 See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 73 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining that an inability to identify a correct 
method for interpreting the Constitution does not prevent one from pointing out incorrect 
methods). 
11 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 
830 (1988).  
12 See, e.g., John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17, 21 (1924) 
(noting that the type of logic “which has had greatest historic currency and exercised greatest 
influence on legal decisions, is that of the syllogism”).  
13 Posner, supra note 11, at 831. 
14 Dewey, supra note 12, at 21-22. 
15 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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The extent to which syllogistic reasoning is at the core of legal formalism 
depends on the definition of legal formalism.16  While I acknowledge that there is no 
widely accepted definition of legal formalism, I agree with Professor Radin that 
“[t]raditionally, legal ‘formalism’ is the position that a unique answer in a particular 
case can be ‘deduced’ from a rule, or that application of a rule to a particular is 
‘analytical.’”17  For my purposes, it suffices to recognize the core of legal formalism 
as the “traditional conception of the nature of rules, [that] a rule is self-applying to 
the set of particulars said to fall under it; its application is thought to be analytic.”18  
By analytic, of course, Professor Radin means the technical sense of the word—that 
the truthfulness of the proposition is not contingent on the world at large.  For 
example, if I state that 2 + 2 = 4, I do not need to examine the empirical world to 
know that the proposition is true.19 
In this way, syllogistic reasoning is analytic.  One need know nothing about the 
world to state that all men are mortal, and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates must be 
mortal.20  However, my project is not aimed at criticizing the use of syllogisms or of 
pure legal formalism.   
Rather, for the purposes of this paper, the essential point of legal formalism is its 
emphasis on the notion of an antecedent rule to which the facts are applied (and 
which gives forth the conclusion).  Dewey notes that syllogistic reasoning “implies 
that for every possible case which may arise, there is a fixed antecedent rule already 
at hand . . . .”21  This is what gives rise to the rule → facts → decision formula.  
There is a rule, to which the particular facts of a given case are applied, out of which 
a decision is produced.  The Socrates syllogism illustrates the point.  The “rule” is 
                                                                
16 Cf. Dewey, supra note 12, at 21 (observing that for Justice Holmes, “logic is equivalent 
with the syllogism . . . in accord with the orthodox tradition”). 
17 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 793 (1989). 
18 Id. at 795. 
19 In contrast, if I say that “The University of Houston is in Texas,” one would have to 
know something about the empirical world (or consult an encyclopedia, etc.) to evaluate the 
truth of that statement.  This case is described as a “synthetic” proposition.  As Dewey 
elaborates, “the philosophy embodied in the formal theory of the syllogism asserted that 
thought or reason has fixed forms of its own, anterior to and independent of concrete subject-
matters . . . .”  Dewey, supra note 12, at 21. 
20 In the technical sense, a valid argument is one in which if the premises are true, then the 
conclusion must necessarily follow.  HOWARD POSPESEL, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC: 
PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC 4 (3d ed. 2000).  The following argument is thus valid: 
p: Napoleon was Japanese. 
p: All Japanese are Europeans. 
∴ Napoleon was European. 
This is valid, because if the premises are true, the conclusion must follow.  Of course, the 
premises are dubious, but that does not render the argument invalid, because technical validity 
concerns the form of the argument, rather than the content.  This, of course, explains why the 
syllogism is a core element of legal formalism—it is a logical form that need not be filled with 
empirical content to be valid.  It is analytic. 
21 Dewey, supra note 12, at 22. 
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that all men are mortal, the “fact” is that Socrates is a man, and the “decision” is that 
Socrates is mortal.  In this form of reasoning, the rule precedes the fact.  If, for 
example, one was not aware of the rule or rule-like proposition that all men are 
mortal, the conclusion that Socrates is mortal does not follow.  To make sense of a 
syllogism, the rule must exist antecedent to the specific case established by the minor 
premise.     
The concept of the rule existing antecedent to the facts is crucial and will be 
explored in detail in the following section.  Having examined this conceptual 
underpinning of legal formalism, I now turn to an explanation of the specific link 
between legal formalism and textualism-originalism. 
III.  TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM FOLLOW THE FORMALIST MODEL 
A.  Basic Premises of Textualism and Originalism 
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia put it quite succinctly: “[o]f 
all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is 
‘formalistic.’  The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic!  The rule of law is 
about form.”22  Aside from a formalist, Justice Scalia also calls himself a textualist-
originalist.23 
Both textualism and originalism are descendants and close kin to the traditions of 
legal formalism.  Textualism is a constitutional hermeneutic that purportedly 
explains the proper way of interpreting the Constitution.  Rather than identifying 
what the law ought to be, a textualist construes the meaning of the constitutional text 
itself and conforms the words of the text to fit this desired interpretation.  Justice 
Scalia terms the latter approach the “common-law attitude” of the federal judge.24 
A textualist approach argues that a decision may be desirable because it advances 
freedom or creates an Orwellian equality for all,25 but is nevertheless wrong if it fails 
                                                                
22 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (1997). 
23 Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 129, 132 (1997).  As an aside, I would like to note here that I am examining textualism 
and originalism as it strikes Justice Scalia.  I am well aware that the intellectual edifices of 
textualism and originalism are not monolithic, and that there may be other variants.  In this 
article, I am concerned only with the model of textualism and originalism that Justice Scalia 
espouses.  However, I do suspect that Justice Scalia’s model has features that are significant to 
most serious notions of textualism and originalism. 
24 Scalia, supra note 22, at 13 (“I do question the attitude of the common-law judge—the 
mind-set that asks ‘What is the most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any 
impediments to the achievement of that result be evaded?’”). 
25 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(describing the majority's application of the Americans with Disabilities Act as “its Animal 
Farm determination [regarding] fairness . . .”). 
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to follow the words of the text.26  “The text is the law and it is the text that must be 
observed.”27 
Of course, Justice Scalia acknowledges that “a good textualist is not a literalist,”28 
and stresses that textualism is not strict constructionism.29  The textualism Justice 
Scalia espouses recognizes that there is a range of possible meanings words may 
have—there is not only one possible meaning, which is what a strict constructionist 
might hold.30  Nevertheless, the range is limited, “and no interpretation that goes 
beyond that range is permissible.”31 
Originalism directs a judge to search for the original meaning of the 
constitutional text, or in other words, the way the Constitution was originally 
understood at the time of its inception.32  Originalism is not the search for the 
original intent of the Framers—it is rather the search for the original meaning of the 
constitutional provision(s) at issue.33 
Thus, textualism and originalism work in tandem, at least for Justice Scalia.  
Textualism aids a judge in staying close to the meaning of the text, and originalism 
ensures the judge will interpret the Constitution according to its original meaning, 
rather than interpreting the text according to “the philosophy of Hume, or of John 
Rawls, or of John Stuart Mill, or of Aristotle[.]”34 
The similarity between these two methods of interpretation is their purpose: to 
constrain the “common-law attitude” of the judge.  The problem with judge-made 
law is that it seems to exist uncomfortably with, if not in stark contradiction to, the 
notion of separation of powers.35  A federal judge is appointed, rather than elected as 
the representative of the people, and is therefore not charged with the responsibility 
to promulgate laws.  The difficulty is that the “common-law attitude,” insofar as it 
directs a judge to find the interpretation he or she feels most just rather than the 
                                                                
26 Scalia, supra note 22, at 22 (reasoning that a specific decision “was wrong because it 
failed to follow the text”).  
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 24. 
29 Id. at 23 (terming strict constructionism a “degraded form of textualism”). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 45 (“[T]he originalist at least knows what he is looking for: the original meaning 
of the text.”). 
33 Id. at 38 (instructing that the proper search is for the “original meaning of the text, not 
what the original draftsman intended”). 
34 Id. at 45.  Justice Scalia’s point is that, sans originalism, a judge has no proper standard 
for evaluating what meaning the Constitution has evolved to.  Id.  Under an originalist 
approach, the standard is quite clear—the meaning to be applied to the facts is the meaning 
that most resembles, if not matches, the meaning of the constitutional provision at issue at the 
time the provision was adopted.  See id. 
35 As Justice Scalia remarks, judge-made law “would be an unqualified good [] were it not 
for a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, called democracy.”  Id. at 9. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
280 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:273 
interpretation that remains faithful to the original meaning of the text, “render[s] 
democratically adopted texts mere springboards for judicial lawmaking.”36 
Judges ought not make law, according to Justice Scalia, because it is the function 
of legislators to make law.37  Textualism and originalism serve to enhance 
democracy by ensuring that only those elected by the citizenry with the express 
purpose of promulgating law do in fact make law.  Textualism and originalism 
accomplish this by constraining the judge to remain faithful to the original meaning 
of the words of the constitutional text.  Therefore, the essence of both textualism and 
originalism is proper constraint.  A judge who does not interpret the Constitution 
according to the dictates of textualism and originalism virtually guarantees, 
according to Justice Scalia, that the judge’s predilections about what the law ought to 
be will inevitably color the judge’s interpretation of what the law is.  “Should there 
be—to take one of the less controversial examples—a constitutional right to die?  If 
so, there is.  Should there be a constitutional right to reclaim a biological child put 
out for adoption by the other parent?  If so, there is.”38 
Insofar as the chief purpose of textualism and originalism is the same—to 
properly constrain a judge’s constitutional interpretations such that they do not 
impermissibly become what the judge thinks the Constitution ought or ought not 
provide—I will treat them as constituents of the same functional hermeneutic unit 
and refer to them singularly as textualism-originalism.39  Though obviously 
textualism and originalism are not equivalent, I adopt this locution for ease of 
reference, and also because my critique applies equally to both textualism and 
originalism.  This is because my critique challenges whether these meta-rules could 
possibly fulfill their raison d’etre and constrain interpretation.  Even Justice Scalia 
regards them as somewhat coextensive; he terms himself a “textualist-originalist.”40 
B.  Cases Applying Textualism and Originalism 
Before turning to the substance of my critique, it seems worthwhile to examine 
textualism and originalism in action—to see how Justice Scalia applies them in 
actual decisions.  I will use three cases to depict how Justice Scalia applies the 
hermeneutics. 
The first case is Michael H. v. Gerald D.41  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia virtually encapsulates his philosophy of textualism and its import when he 
notes that: 
[w]ithout that core textual meaning as a limitation [on the definition of the 
term ‘liberty’], defining the scope of the Due Process Clause ‘has at times 
                                                                
36 Id. at 25. 
37 This is not to assert that Justice Scalia denigrates the common law as a whole.  Rather, 
he rejects the common law attitude of the judge inasmuch as that attitude directs judges to 
stray from the meaning of the statutory text in favor of their own desired interpretations.  The 
topic of Justice Scalia’s essay is federal judges, who are, of course, not elected. 
38 Id. at 39. 
39 See supra note 3. 
40 Scalia, supra note 22, at 132. 
41 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
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been a treacherous field for this Court,’ giving ‘reason for concern lest the 
only limits to . . . judicial intervention become the predilections of those 
who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.’42 
It is fidelity to the “core textual meaning” that prevents judging from becoming 
merely the whims of the judges instantiated.  Accordingly, Justice Scalia highlights 
the need for “restraint.”43  This is textualism, or at least textualism as it strikes Justice 
Scalia. 
Justice Scalia also expounds originalism in the case.44  Justice Scalia explains, 
“[i]n an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due Process] Clause, we 
have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a ‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’ 
(a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest 
traditionally protected by our society.”45  Note the metaphor at work in this analysis: 
the purpose of examining the historical treatment of the liberty interest at issue is to 
“limit and guide interpretation.”46  The prism of interpretation is whether the 
“asserted liberty interest [is] rooted in history and tradition.”47  This is originalism. 
Two cases more recently decided by the United States Supreme Court show how 
textualism and originalism continue to have meaning for Justice Scalia.  The case of 
INS v. St. Cyr, a case that has grown more relevant since the events of September 
2001, concerned the meaning of the Suspension Clause.48  In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Scalia argued that “[a] straightforward reading of this text discloses that it 
does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas 
corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not . . . be suspended.”49  Here, Justice 
Scalia is applying the meta-rule of textualism (remaining faithful to the meaning of 
the words of the text) to ascertain the correct rule of law.  He reasons that it would be 
unacceptable “for this Court to write a habeas law, in order that the Suspension 
Clause might have some effect.”50 
Justice Scalia thus employs the textualist model to point to the “plain meaning” 
of the constitutional text and to constrain the Court’s alleged temptation to write a 
habeas law.51  It is the latter predilection that textualism is intended to guard against.  
Moreover, following this section of Justice Scalia’s dissent, he proceeds to analyze 
                                                                
42 Id. at 121 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)) (alteration in 
original). 
43 Id. at 122. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 123. 
48 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300-01 (2001). 
49 Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
50 Id. at 338. 
51 Id. at 334 (reflecting on the frequent occurrence of courts “distort[ing] plain statutory 
text in order to produce a ‘more sensible’ result”).  
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how the Framers and those alive when the Constitution was originally ratified 
understood the term “suspend.”52  This is the originalist hermenutic in action. 
In a terse dissent in Shafer v. South Carolina, Justice Scalia argues that the 
majority decision, though consistent with precedent, is inconsistent with the 
Constitution.  He implies that the majority is making law: “I am more attached to the 
logic of the Constitution, whose Due Process Clause was understood as an 
embodiment of common-law tradition, rather than as authority for federal courts to 
promulgate wise national rules of criminal procedure.”53  Justice Scalia’s apparent 
point is that the text of the Constitution simply does not instantiate the rule the 
majority finds.  Even if the majority’s rule is desirable, when it is not supported by a 
reasonable construction of the words of the Constitution, it is impermissible.54 
In Michael H., St. Cyr, and Shafer, and in the textualism and originalism models 
generally, it is the application of the meta-rule itself that determines the correct 
interpretation and simultaneously serves to constrain judicial discretion.  Justice 
Scalia does not contest the majority’s assessment in either St. Cyr or Shafer that the 
rule of the case is wise or appropriate.  This is precisely the point of the textualism 
and originalism hermeneutics.  To its proponents, and particularly Justice Scalia, the 
Constitution cannot be thought of as an evolving document due to the lack of 
standards that govern what the Constitution has evolved to mean.55  Whether the 
proposed rule is wise or desirable does not negate the notion that it is undemocratic, 
not to mention dangerous, for appointed judges to be essentially promulgating law. 
Thus goes the rationale for the textualism and originalism hermeneutics.  
Apparently grounded in respect for democracy and separation of powers, textualism 
and originalism constrain the judge from an interpretation that strays from the 
original meaning of the constitutional text.  Such constraint is necessary to prevent a 
judge from substituting his or her own predilections for what the law actually is. 
I am not averse to the rationale for textualism-originalism.  I am sympathetic to 
Justice Scalia’s arguments concerning the antidemocratic nature of the common-law 
judge.  If there were some way of preventing judges from making policy, of keeping 
that function solely in the hands of the legislators, I might well agree with the 
desirability of using that method.  The key clause for me, however, is “if there were 
some way.”  Justice Scalia thinks there is a way: the textualism-originalism 
hermeneutic.  This is where our disagreement arises.  I do not believe that 
textualism-originalism can possibly serve to constrain judicial interpretation.  I 
believe all judges make policy, for better or worse.56  In my opinion, it is impossible 
for judges to do anything but make policy.57 
                                                                
52 Id. at 337. 
53 Shafer v. S.C., 532 U.S. 36, 55 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54 See id. (“Providing . . . information [to the jury regarding the possibility of parole for 
the defendant] may well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help the 
defendant’s case)—and many States have indeed required it . . . . The Constitution, however, 
does not.”). 
55 See Scalia, supra note 22, at 44-47 (imparting that there is a lack of a guiding principle 
assessing how the meaning of the Constitution has evolved). 
56 Professor Robert Cover coins the phrase “jurisgenerative” to describe the judicial 
function; that “the problem [is] of the multiplicity of meaning . . . the too fertile forces of 
jurisgenesis . . . .”  Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15-16 
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In a prior article, I argued that the textualism-originalism hermeneutic 
fundamentally misconstrues the way individuals interact with the world.58  I 
contended that textualism-originalism is predicated on flawed scientific metaphors 
that have long since been rejected by the scientific community.59  Scientists rejected 
these models because they no longer accurately described the world we inhabit.60  I 
urged that the legal community ought similarly reject the textualism-originalism 
model for precisely the same reason.61 
I tack a different course in this article, though I hope to arrive at a similar 
conclusion: textualism-originalism cannot possibly do what its proponents assert it 
does—constrain, if not prevent, judicial lawmaking.  The reason it cannot constrain 
judicial lawmaking is inherent in the very concept of the meta-rule itself.  I do not 
explain the scientific metaphor behind the meta-rule in this article, but the analytic 
concept of what it is to be a meta-rule and of what I believe rules do—and of what I 
believe they do not do.  In this, I am guided by the later philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. 
                                                           
(1983).  Judges, he observes, “are people of violence.”  Id. at 53.  “[T]he jurisgenerative 
principle by which legal meaning proliferates in all communities never exists in isolation from 
violence.”  Id. at 40.  Connecting the phenomenon to the open expanse of interpretation, he 
explains that “[i]t is the multiplicity of laws, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle, that 
creates the problem to which the court and the state are the solution.”  Id.  I believe Justice 
Scalia might actually concur with this analysis insofar as it dovetails with his analysis of the 
“attitude of the common-law judge.”  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
57 However, I reject the coherence of the criticism that a particular judge is making law, or 
legislating from the bench.  Since no judicial opinion is subject to bicameralism and 
presentment, it follows that judges plainly do not make law.  I do not mean this as a mere 
quibble over semantics, because there is good reason for rejecting the notion that judges make 
law. 
Namely, once it is established that no judge makes law, or legislates from the bench, one 
is left with the rather pedestrian notion that judges make policy.  The extent to which judicial 
policy-making is either desirable or warranted is far more complicated than the question of 
whether judges ought to make law.  Few would agree that judges should truly make law; 
indeed, the very obviousness of the transgression of separation of powers is what makes the 
criticism “this judge is making law” so effective.  Given that policy-making seems to be an 
element of the judicial function, whereas legislating is not, it is the former that is the most 
fruitful locus for inquiry.  The latter is incoherent, and something of a straw man, as well. 
58 Daniel S. Goldberg, Comment, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical 
Scientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of Textualism and Originalism, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
463, 467 & n.20 (2002). 
59 Id. at 475 & n.80. 
60 Id. at 487. 
61 Id. at 490. 
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IV.  A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF  
RULE-FOLLOWING 
A.  Caveats 
As previously noted, I am espousing a somewhat controversial position using 
Wittgenstein’s analysis.62  Namely, I find that Wittgenstein’s analysis in 
Philosophical Investigations can be used to support an argument that all rules, 
including legal rules (and meta-rules), are indeterminate.  Several caveats must be 
observed before proceeding. 
First, I do not argue, as do some scholars of Wittgenstein, that he himself actually 
espoused skepticism.  I do believe that his analysis can be employed in support of an 
argument for rule indeterminacy, regardless of whether he personally espoused 
skepticism regarding rule-following.  Second, as noted in the Introduction, the 
conception of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as demonstrating skeptical tendencies 
through the concept of rule indeterminacy is controversial.63  In all fairness, such a 
view is probably supported by only a minority of Wittgenstein scholars.  I thus 
present the argument neither as recognized truth nor as established Wittgensteinian 
doctrine, but as one possible way of reading Philosophical Investigations.  In any 
case, as I shall demonstrate, even if I am incorrect in my reading of Wittgenstein, the 
alternate reading urged by the majority of Wittgenstein scholars does not save the 
textualism-originalism hermeneutic from incoherence. 
B.  Kripke’s Argument for Rule Skepticism and the Implications for Textualism and 
Originalism 
1.  The Argument 
Saul Kripke voiced similar caution in his well-known book, Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private Language.64  He stressed that he did not view his analysis as pure 
explication of Wittgenstein’s argument, but rather as “Wittgenstein’s argument as it 
struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him.”65 
Nevertheless, Kripke’s analysis is the support I proffer for a reading of rule 
indeterminacy.  Kripke begins by citing § 201 in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations: “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a 
                                                                
62 See notes 5-7, supra, and accompanying text. 
63 See, e.g., Bix, supra note 6, at 108 n.10 (“It is very hard to find a Wittgenstein scholar 
who is in substantial agreement with Kripke's reading.”).  Kripke explained the notion of rule 
indeterminacy as he perceived it from the Investigations.   SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON 
RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982).  
64 KRIPKE, supra note 63.  I will examine a sampling of the criticisms of Kripke’s analysis, 
and respond to them in kind.   
65 Id. at 5; see also MCGINN, supra note 5, at 74 (same).  Some scholars, however, dispute 
that Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein is in any way Wittgensteinian, terming the book as 
“Kripgenstein.”  See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and 
Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 571 & n.38 (1993). 
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rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule.”66  Kripke 
attempts to explain the paradox. 
He begins by considering the rule for addition.  Kripke notes that, “[a]lthough I 
myself have computed only finitely many sums in the past, the rule determines my 
answer for indefinitely many new sums that I have never previously considered.”67  
Or does it?  He poses a “simple” expression of this rule: that when one adds 68 + 57, 
the computation yields 125.68  Kripke supposes that the individual performing the 
computation has never performed this computation, nor any computation involving 
addends greater than 56.69 
Kripke then poses the existence of a “bizarre skeptic,” who questions the 
computation.70  This skeptic contends that the answer to “68 + 57” is 5.71  The 
skeptic reasons that the individual computing (hereinafter, “the adder”) has actually 
changed what he means by “+” if the answer to 68 + 57 is 125.  Rather, the rule the 
adder has applied up until this point will yield 5, the skeptic challenges. 
How?  The adder cannot produce a sum of 125 by “explicitly [giving the adder] 
instructions that 125 is the result of performing the addition in this particular 
instance.  By hypothesis, [the adder] did no such thing.”72  The skeptic continues his 
troubling analysis, noting that the adder has only in the past computed 
a finite number of examples instantiating this function . . . . So perhaps in 
the past [the adder] used ‘plus’ and ‘+’ to denote a function which I will 
call ‘quus’ and symbolize by ‘⊕’.  It is defined by: x ⊕ y = x + y, if x.y < 
57 = 5 otherwise.  Who is to say that this is not the function I previously 
meant by ‘+’?73 
Essentially, the skeptic argues that the adder has always added numbers 
according to the “quus” function, and is “now misinterpreting [his] own previous 
usage . . . now, under the influence of some insane frenzy, or a bout of LSD, I have 
come to misinterpret my own previous usage.”74  If correct, the skeptic’s argument 
illustrates that there is no fact arising out of the adder’s past that establishes that the 
adder meant “plus” rather than “quus.”75  “But if this is correct, there can of course 
                                                                
66 See KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 7 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 81e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Prentice Hall 3d ed. 1958) (1953)).  Many 
scholars have expressed dismay at reading a statement of Wittgenstein’s out of the context of 
the sections that preceded and/or followed it.  See, e.g., Bix, supra note 6 and accompanying 
text. 
67 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 7. 
68 Id. at 8. 
69 See Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  This follows because the adder has not yet computed this sum in the past. 
73 Id. at 8-9. 
74 Id. at 9. 
75 Id. at 13. 
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be no fact about which function [the adder] meant, and if there can be no fact about 
which particular function [the adder] meant in the past, there can be none in the 
present either.”76  There is nothing that justifies the adder’s response of “125” to the 
computation of 68 + 57, rather than answering “5.”  “Every possible answer is 
compatible with some possible function, and thus the idea of any answer being the 
correct answer becomes completely idle or empty.”77 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for my purposes, Kripke completes the 
sketch of the argument by rejecting the possibility that meta-rules can resolve the 
skeptical paradox.  Kripke considers the possibility that one may develop an 
algorithm for addition, a set of instructions that directs the adder to come up with 
125 in answer to the computation 68 + 57.78  This set of instructions comprises a 
meta-rule.  It is a rule, or set of rules, for interpreting or applying the rule of addition. 
Ultimately, Kripke rejects the utility of meta-rules for establishing rule 
determinacy because the meta-rules themselves fall prey to the same skeptical 
analysis enumerated above.  As Professor McGinn explains, there will “always be a 
way of interpreting the additional rule that will bring its application into conformity 
with the original rule.”79  Suppose, Kripke says, that the meta-rule charges the adder 
to count out a given number of marbles (x) in a heap, to which another number (y) in 
a separate heap is added, yielding a new heap consisting of x + y.80  Counting out 68 
marbles in one heap and 57 marbles in another heap cannot possibly yield 5 marbles.  
Therefore, goes Kripke’s response to the skeptic, the meta-rule (or algorithm) 
dictates the correct application of the rule: “plus” rather than “quus.”  However, this 
analysis fails to resolve the paradox. 
But I applied ‘count’, like ‘plus’, to only finitely many past cases.  Thus 
the sceptic can question my present interpretation of my past usage of 
‘count’ as he did with ‘plus’.  In particular, he can claim that by ‘count’ I 
formerly meant quount, where to ‘quount’ a heap is to count it in the 
ordinary sense, unless the heap was formed as the union of two heaps, one 
of which has 57 or more items, in which case one must automatically give 
the answer ‘5’.  It is clear that if in the past ‘counting’ meant quounting, 
and if I follow the rule for ‘plus’ that was quoted so triumphantly to the 
sceptic, I must admit that ‘68 + 57’ must yield the answer ‘5’.81 
In short, “[r]ules for interpreting rules don’t get us any further.”82  Furthermore, 
Kripke explicitly notes that the difficulty is not restricted merely to mathematical 
                                                                
76 Id. 
77 MCGINN, supra note 5, at 76 (explaining Kripke’s analysis). 
78 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 16. 
79 MCGINN, supra note 5, at 77 (explaining Kripke’s analysis).  It should be noted that 
Professor McGinn assuredly rejects Kripke’s analysis, though she depicts it accurately, and 
does not specifically disabuse Kripke’s argument concerning meta-rules.  I therefore see no 
difficulty with using her succinct explication of Kripke’s argument for my own admittedly 
brief analysis. 
80 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 15. 
81 Id. at 16. 
82 MCGINN, supra note 5, at 77. 
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cases.83  “For any word in my language, we can come up with alternative 
interpretations of what I mean by it that are compatible with both my past usage and 
any explicit instruction that I might have given myself.”84  For example, Kripke 
considers his application of the word “green” to a new circumstance: “Perhaps by 
‘green’ in the past I meant grue, and the color image, which indeed was grue, was 
meant to direct me to apply the word ‘green’ to grue objects always.”85  And so on 
and so forth, in a reductio ad absurdum. 
To summarize, if Kripke’s argument is valid, it illustrates that one’s application 
of a rule “is an unjustified stab in the dark.  [One applies] the rule blindly.”86  
Moreover, any meta-rule, or rule used to interpret or apply another rule correctly or 
determinately, is likewise impossible.  A meta-rule is just as much an unjustified stab 
in the dark as a functional rule itself (such as addition).  “The rule cannot by itself 
determine correct applications (because there is no fact of the matter that makes the 
rule inconsistent with one application and consistent with another).”87 
                                                                
83 See KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 19 (“These problems apply throughout language and are 
not confined to mathematical examples.”); see also Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Note, Breaking 
the Rules?: Wittgenstein and Legal Realism, 107 YALE L.J. 1853, 1871-72 (1998).  
Arulanantham explains that, 
[a]s Kripke made clear, the arguments for the indeterminacy of meaning guided by 
rules are general.  Just as there is no fact that can definitively settle what someone 
meant by ‘plus’ in a previous case, there is also no fact about what the rule that two 
signatures make a valid will meant with respect to this new case (e.g., it may have 
meant two signatures make a valid will except when the inheritor did wrong to gain 
inheritance, or something more bizarre, such as the meaning must be different once we 
enter the age of electronic signatures, so that now a will needs three signatures). 
Id. at 1872.  Arulanantham’s paper coheres in many significant ways with the views I will 
attempt to articulate here.  The fact that Arulanantham’s paper is a Note may mean that the 
paper is a student’s product.  Insofar as one may question the wisdom of relying too much on 
student work, I am reminded of the Italian humanist Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s (1463-
1494) admonition to his audience that, “since it will be their task to judge my discoveries and 
my scholarship, they ought to look to the merit or demerit of these and not to the age of their 
author.”  GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 11 (trans. 
C.R. Shalizi), available at http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Mirandola. 
84 MCGINN, supra note 5, at 77. 
85 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 20. 
86 Id. at 17.  As a side note, it is worth mentioning that Kripke does not endorse the 
skeptical argument he has laid out because he enumerates a “sceptical solution.”  See id. at 55 
(laying out the solution to the skeptical paradox).  Kripke is careful to label his solution as 
skeptical in nature: “[a] sceptical solution of a sceptical philosophical problem begins . . . by 
conceding that the sceptic’s negative assertions are unanswerable.”  Id. at 66.  I will address 
Kripke’s skeptical solution below. 
87 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1869.  Arulanantham explicitly links Kripke’s 
argument to law: “If language exhibits this baseline indeterminacy, and legal rules are built on 
language (and share all of its instability), legal propositions can have no determinative force 
either.  Therefore, the realists conclude, judges are never compelled by rules.”  Id. at 1866. 
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2.  Implications for Textualism and Originalism 
I find Kripke’s analysis simply devastating.  If he is correct, any hope of utilizing 
textualism-originalism to constrain judicial interpretation is baseless.  This is because 
the meta-rule cannot possibly determine which of several possibilities is the correct 
application or interpretation.  Application of the textualism-originalism hermeneutic 
does not determine whether the Constitution grants individuals a right to die because 
there is no fact about a judge’s history that allows the judge to conclude that deciding 
one way versus the other is consistent with the judge’s prior applications of 
textualism-originalism.  The point of Kripke’s argument is to demonstrate that one 
“can have no justification for one response rather than another.”88  It is entirely 
consistent to apply the textualism-originalism hermeneutic to a constitutional 
dilemma and use it to justify any response whatsoever because the rule, or meta-rule 
in this case, is irreducibly indeterminate.  The rule cannot by itself determine correct 
applications.89  As Wittgenstein himself stated, “whatever is going to seem right to 
me is right.”90  In short: 
Wittgenstein’s arguments against a rule-based picture (which show that a 
rule-based picture justifies skepticism) apply quite straightforwardly to 
law.  Consequently, the arguments for why a rule-based picture of 
language cannot provide linguistic determinacy also give us good reasons 
to believe that a rule-based picture of law cannot generate legal 
determinacy.91     
Under the same analysis, nor can meta-rules generate legal determinacy.  As 
such, the raison d’etre of textualism-originalism dissipates if Kripke is right.  
Application of textualism-originalism cannot possibly serve to constrain 
interpretation if every interpretation can be made to accord with the original meta-
rule.  It is a fiction, a chimera. 
3.  Challenges to Kripke’s Argument 
The real question is whether Kripke is right.  I will consider two groups of 
responses to Kripke’s analysis.  The first category opines that Wittgenstein would 
                                                                
88 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 21. 
89 See note 79 supra and accompanying text.  Similarly, Professor Marmor explains that  
[t]his is the crucial point: If a rule could not determine which actions were in accord 
with it, then no interpretation could do this either.  Interpretation is just another 
formulation of this rule, substituting one rule with another, as it were.  Hence it cannot 
bridge the gap between a rule and an action. 
Andrei Marmor, No Easy Cases, 3 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 61, 76 (1990). 
90 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 258 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., Prentice Hall 3d ed. 1958) (1953).  Again, I am loath to quote any direct language of 
Wittgenstein out of context of the language surrounding the quote.  Kripke himself cites this 
language, see KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 23-24, and expressly notes that this seems apparently 
contrary to Wittgenstein’s own aims.  However, there is neither the time nor the space to 
canvass the imposing literature on how to read or not to read Wittgenstein.  I follow Kripke’s 
lead in quoting such language here, and I trust that quoting verbatim the primary source on 
occasion does not constitute too woeful an infirmity. 
91 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1872. 
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assuredly not agree with Kripke’s interpretation of his later philosophy, and that 
“Kripgenstein”92 invents a paradox that is not, and would not, be supported by 
Wittgenstein.  The second category attacks Kripke’s argument on its face and argues 
that the skeptical paradox he claims to have traced is absurd.  The two categories are 
related. 
a.  First Category of Challenges 
As to the first category, Professor McGinn’s analysis is illustrative.  She 
essentially argues that Wittgenstein was largely concerned with exposing the 
incoherence of some entrenched theories of meaning.  However, in depicting these 
difficulties, she argues, nowhere does he espouse any kind of skeptical beliefs.  In 
fact, goes the argument, Wittgenstein’s concern is largely based in anti-skepticism—
in showing how rule-based meaning is possible (while destroying the traditional 
basis for rule determinacy). 
Professor McGinn begins by examining Wittgenstein’s discussion of a cube.93   
He asks us to reflect on what does actually come before my mind when I 
hear and understand the word ‘cube’ . . . Perhaps, he suggests, what 
comes before my mind is a schematic drawing of a cube.  Now the 
question is how does the schematic drawing that comes before my mind 
connect with the use I go on to make of the word ‘cube.’94 
An objection similar to that raised by the bizarre skeptic may be posed here.  The use 
of the schematic drawing of a cube supposedly steers one to conclude that a 
triangular prism does not fit the schematic.95  “Wittgenstein responds: ‘Doesn’t it fit? 
I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of 
projection according to which the picture does fit after all.’”96 
This sounds like Kripke’s argument for skepticism, but Professor McGinn 
disabuses the notion.  According to Professor McGinn, Wittgenstein’s point is not 
that any interpretation of a rule can be justified, but rather, that “there is a great 
temptation to misunderstand or misrepresent the nature of this link [between the 
schematic and the cube].”97  Wittgenstein’s project is to point out the errors of our 
traditional ways of thinking, not to ground a radical form of skepticism.  His point 
“is to reveal that the picture we’re inclined to construct in response to the question 
‘What is understanding?’ is empty, and that everything that we need to remove our 
puzzlement lies already open to view in our practice of using language.”98 
                                                                
92 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
93 MCGINN, supra note 5, at 83. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 83-84. 
96 Id. at 84 (citing WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 90, at § 139). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 97. 
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I daresay that many scholars of Wittgenstein agree that he was uniquely 
concerned with language as a practice.99  The picture Wittgenstein depicts as empty 
is a picture that requires some rule that embodies the logical connection we believe 
must exist between the schematic and the cube.  “Thus the connection between a rule 
and a practice that Wittgenstein makes is not put forward as a philosophical analysis 
of the concept of ‘a rule’, but is intended to describe what is observable in the 
structure of our language-game, in how our concepts actually function.”100 
The words we use are not justified by any logical connection between our 
past history and our present usage of the word—and they do not need to 
be.  [W]e can see that ordinary practice does not depend upon the spurious 
idea of a mysterious link between a rule and its use, simply by observing 
the fact that our ordinary experience of the rules of our language involves 
a sense of how the rule must be applied that is completely independent of 
this notion.101 
Once we wean ourselves of the requirement that a logical connection compels the 
connection of schematic and cube, or of the addition function and “68 + 57,” “the 
actual ground of our practice of rule-following [is left] completely untouched.”102  As 
Wittgenstein himself noted, “[a]nd hence ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.”103 
Before I respond to this critique (though I will ultimately accept it arguendo), it 
is worthwhile to note that Professor McGinn’s argument does not challenge Kripke’s 
view that Wittgenstein rejects a theory of meaning based on logical connections 
between rules and applications.  On the contrary, she accepts it, but reasons that as 
grounded in our practice, we simply do not need such logical compulsions to use 
language meaningfully.104  “Wittgenstein’s target in the passages on rule following 
was not meaning itself, but rather a particular rule-based picture of meaning.”105  In 
                                                                
99 See, e.g., id. at 103 (tracing Wittgenstein’s analysis as based on the notion of language 
as practice rather than a set of rules). 
100 Id. at 102-03. 
101 Id. at 104-05. 
102 Id. at 105. 
103 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 90, at § 202; see also Bix, supra note 6.  Bix reasons that 
"[t]he sceptic's complaint is unwarranted because there is nothing more that could be offered 
as justification and there is nothing more that is needed as justification."  Bix, supra note 6, at 
109.  Professor Marmor concurs: "[W]hatever it is that connects a rule to its application cannot 
consist of logic or analyticity."  Marmor, supra note 89, at 64-65.   
104 See MCGINN, supra note 5, at 105 (“The emptiness of the idea that there is something 
in the rule itself that compels this application shows only that our practice of following rules is 
not dependent on this altogether mysterious idea.”).  Thus, Professor McGinn agrees with 
Kripke that the notion of a theory of meaning wholly based on the notion of rules and 
propositions is incoherent; she terms the idea of logical connection between a rule and its 
application a “chimera.”  Id.  
105 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1869. 
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other words, Professor McGinn accepts that Wittgenstein repudiates a rule-based 
theory of meaning.106 
Indeed, Kripke himself reaches a similar conclusion as McGinn, albeit for 
disparate reasons.  He ultimately resolves the paradox by way of a skeptical solution.  
In a passage that is reminiscent of some of his critics, Kripke notes that even though 
the skeptical paradox can never be truly resolved, “[n]evertheless our ordinary 
practice or belief is justified because—contrary appearances notwithstanding—it 
need not require the justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable.”107  
Justification is not required because when “each of us automatically calculates new 
addition problems (without feeling the need to check with the community whether 
our procedure is proper) . . . the community feels entitled to correct a deviant 
calculation [and] in practice such deviation is rare . . . .”108 
Though McGinn does not expressly make this move, many of the anti-Kripkeans 
reason that “it is the community’s agreement in judgments that make our practices 
stable.”109  Kripke agrees, though he assuredly does not embrace the view that it is 
community consensus that establishes the truth of our applications of a rule.110  
Instead, Kripke argues that Wittgenstein replaces a truth-condition theory of meaning 
with an assertability-condition theory of meaning.111  The difference is subtle but 
                                                                
106 However, she takes pains to stress that she does not agree with Kripke that 
Wittgenstein offers a positive theory of meaning.  Wittgenstein, she argues, achieves “a 
resolution of the tangle of philosophical problems that surround the concepts of meaning, rules 
and understanding by doing something other than provide a theory of what meaning or rule-
following consist in.”  MCGINN, supra note 5, at 81.  See also Coleman & Leiter, supra note 
65, at 572 (“Wittgenstein’s goal—as opposed to Kripkenstein’s—is to call into question a 
certain Platonic picture of the foundation of semantics that some might have thought explains 
or justifies important features of our linguistic practices.”). 
107 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 66. 
108 Id. at 111-12.  I must admit that Kripke’s analysis here sounds strikingly similar to the 
points critics assert as errors in Kripke’s argument.  If so, perhaps Kripke and his critics agree 
on more than the literature suggests.  At least one commentator observes that “every legal 
scholar that I have encountered has misunderstood Kripke’s conclusion.  All of them read 
Kripke as endorsing skepticism.”  Arulanantham, supra note 83, at n.86. 
109 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1870; see also Radin, supra note 17, at 797-802 
(expounding on the “Wittgensteinian Social Conception of Rules”).  Professor Radin is not an 
anti-Kripkean: she assuredly takes Wittgenstein to be rejecting a rule-based theory of 
meaning, and of endorsing a limited brand of skepticism (limited by the extent to which rules 
can be made determinate in practice by the community). 
110 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1868 n.86 (“[Kripke] explicitly rejects the view that 
skepticism is justified and that truth is determined by community consensus.  Instead, he says 
that what we are warranted in asserting is determined by community consensus, while 
remaining agnostic about the truth of these matters.”).  This is partly why I find that Kripke 
and his critics are not as dramatically far apart as the literature might lead one to believe.  To 
be sure, there is a point of contention, but Kripke simply is not a skeptic.  See also Coleman & 
Leiter, supra note 65, at 571 (endorsing Kripke’s skeptical solution as proving adequate 
justification for meaning). 
111 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 74 (opining that “Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language 
based, not on truth conditions, but on assertability conditions or justification conditions: under 
what circumstances are we justified in making a given assertion?”). 
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significant.  For Kripke, community consensus justifies our assertion that a particular 
application conforms to the rule.112  This is distinct from a notion that consensus 
grounds the truth conditions of a particular application of a rule—Kripke does not 
believe that any entity or concept can do so; this is why he terms the solution a 
“skeptical solution” (one which grants that the skeptical paradox is unanswerable).   
“On this account of Wittgenstein, it is the community’s agreement in judgments 
that make our practices stable.  Judgments about right and wrong ways to follow 
rules are immune from skeptical doubt because there is a settled practice that 
determines what counts as following a rule correctly.”113 
It appears, then, that both Kripke and his critics concur that there is a way to save 
the notion of meaning from incoherence.  More importantly, there is a “basis for 
understanding how legal discourse can be determinate, even in the face of the 
skeptical uncertainty that he describes as arising on a purely rule-based view.”114  If 
rules truly are determinate, then this obviously poses a problem for my thesis.  In the 
first case, I argue that rules, including meta-rules, are indeterminate.  I will respond 
to both Kripke and his critics, who maintain that rule determinacy is possible.  Then, 
assuming arguendo that the view of rule determinacy is valid, I will demonstrate 
why this does not save textualism-originalism. 
b.  Second Category of Challenges 
Before embarking along these lines, it is necessary to return to the second 
category of challenges to Kripke’s argument.  Under this second category, critics 
generally agree that justification of an application of the rule is not required, but they 
do so for entirely different reasons.  Whereas Kripke grounds his argument in the 
notion of assertability, critics argue that requiring justification of an application of a 
rule is in and of itself absurd.115  This appears to be a more radical rejection of 
Kripke’s analysis—it is not a skeptical solution because it rejects the paradox as 
absurd altogether. 
The Zapf and Moglen article embodies just such a rejection.116  Zapf and Moglen 
contend that once a scientist produces the hypothesis that “all frogs are green,” 
challenging the scientist to explain how a new “green frog counts as an application 
of [the] hypothesis” is absurd.117 
                                                                
112 See id. (same). 
113 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1870. 
114 Id. at 1868.  (discussing the argument of the “anti-realist” scholars Brian Langille, 
Revolution without Foundation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law, 33 McGill L.J. 451 
(1988); Andrei Marmor, No Easy Cases?, in WITTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis M. 
Patterson ed., 1992); Gene Anne Smith, Wittgenstein and the Sceptical Fallacy, in 
WITTGENSTEIN, supra). 
115 See Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On 
the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.J. 485, 504 (1996) (“[O]ne cannot 
sensibly ask for a justification of what counts as the application of a rule.”); Marmor, supra 
note 89, at 75 (“[I]t simply doesn't make sense to say that one has understood a rule and [not 
know the actions that are in accord with it.]"). 
116 Zaph & Moglen, supra note 115, at 485 (“[T]he logical relation between words and the 
applications we read off from them is unproblematic.”). 
117 Id. at 504. 
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That question surely does not make sense: one cannot question what 
counts as an application if one concedes there is a hypothesis.  The skeptic 
cannot rationally say, ‘I have understood your rule that all frogs are green, 
but I do not understand if this green frog accords with your rule.’  
Understanding a rule consists of the ability to specify what is in accord 
with it.118  
This analysis is entirely unconvincing to me.  In the first case, the argument here 
seems to beg the question.  Namely, once we have already decided that what we have 
is a green frog, the new event has already conformed to the rule.  The entire point of 
the skeptical paradox—in fact, I daresay of any skeptical argument—is to challenge 
an underlying epistemological assertion.  In this case, the assertion in question is 
whether the rule that “all frogs are green” applies to the situation (animal) before us 
now. 
The question is not whether the new green frog counts as an application of the 
rule.  Rather, the more fundamental questions are: (1) whether this animal is in fact a 
“frog” instead of a “quog;” and (2) whether this animal is in fact “green” and not 
“grue.”119  The skeptic will of course argue that our every prior application of the 
rule referred to “quogs,” and that what we have before us is in actuality a “quog” and 
not a “frog.”  Continuing, the skeptic will argue that a “frog” refers only to the set of 
“quogs” that one has viewed pictures of in books.  All other such amphibians, 
including all the ones scientists have experimented on, have in fact been “quogs.”120  
Now, under some kind of delusion or drug-induced hallucination, the scientist is 
thinking that what is before him or her are “frogs” instead of “quogs.”  Along the 
same lines, the skeptic gapes at the scientist and says: “What do you mean this quog 
is green?  This quog is grue!”  The color image the scientist has always associated 
with the word “green” is in fact the color “grue,” and so this “quog” is assuredly the 
color “grue.” 
The skeptic does not say: “I have understood your rule that all frogs are green.”  
In my opinion, the challenge is more fundamental.  The skeptic states: “I am not sure 
about frogs, but this new thing before you is definitely a ‘quog’.”  The skeptic says: 
“The quog before you is the color ‘grue’, so I am not sure where you get this ‘green’ 
business from.” 
                                                                
118 Id.; see also Bix, supra note 6, at 111 ("Similarly, after being taught the colour words 
by ostensive definitions, we will all agree that this particular tomato is red and that patch of 
grass is green."). 
119 Or whether this thing before us is an animal and not a “quanimal,” or whether this 
entity before us is a “thing” and not a “quing” . . . .  
120 This is loosely patterned after Kripke’s analysis of the word “table”: 
I think that I have learned the term ‘table’ in such a way that it will apply to 
indefinitely many future items.  So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I 
enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base.  Can I answer a 
sceptic who supposes that by ‘table’ in the past I meant tabair, where a ‘tabair’ is 
anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found 
there? 
KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 19.  
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In short, the Zapf and Moglen analysis is unpersuasive to me.  To be sure, I find 
the skeptical paradox absurd.  But that is a characteristic of paradoxes.121  Following 
apparently logical chains of reasoning, one arrives at preposterous conclusions.122  
This itself is not reason to dismiss the paradox.  While I do not mean to argue that 
Zapf and Moglen are dismissive, I do find their explanation for why the skeptical 
paradox is illegitimate somewhat lacking.  I fail to understand how the rule that “all 
frogs are green” by itself determines correct applications of that rule.  There is no 
fact about the scientist’s past history that renders the argument that what the scientist 
in fact has is a “grue quog” inconsistent with his or her prior practices. 
In any case, I concur with Kripke that any possible resolution to the skeptical 
paradox must be skeptical in nature—that is, any solution ought to begin by 
accepting the skeptical paradox.  A skeptical solution challenges the conclusion that 
meaning is indeterminate, but does not challenge the premise that a rule-based theory 
of meaning is incoherent.123   
The first category of responses to Kripke essentially holds that “[w]hile 
Wittgenstein did show that a rule-based understanding of language was flawed, 
[they] argue, he did not believe in the indeterminacy or instability of meaning in 
general; in fact, that such instability did not exist was a premise of Wittgenstein’s 
argument.”124  I now move on to reply to this category of responses by first 
challenging it on its face, and then by accepting it but contending that the social 
conception of rule-following does not save textualism-originalism. 
c.  Irrelevancy of Wittgenstein’s Agreement with Kripke 
Whether Wittgenstein would agree with Kripke has little bearing on whether 
Kripke’s analysis is sound.  The notion that rule skepticism is either unsupported by 
Wittgenstein or would be rejected by him is, while significant, inadequate to derail 
that skepticism.  Perhaps Kripke’s analysis is in fact “Kripgenstein” and nothing he 
argues is fully supported by Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.  This hardly 
undermines the merits of the skeptical argument Kripke lays out.  To be sure, if 
Wittgenstein dissents with Kripke, the nature of this dissent must be examined.  
However, simply because Wittgenstein might not agree with what Kripke attributes 
to him does not signify that Kripke’s argument is somehow without merit.125  In any 
                                                                
121 See R.M. SAINSBURY, PARADOXES 1 (2d ed. 1995) (defining a paradox as “an 
apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from 
apparently acceptable premises”). 
122 I am reminded of an excellent article by Peter Unger, entitled I Do Not Exist.  Peter 
Unger, I Do Not Exist, in PERCEPTION AND IDENTITY: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO A.J. AYER (G.F. 
MacDonald, ed., 1979).  Professor Unger uses the sorites paradox to conclude that the concept 
of “I” is incoherent.  Or, consider the Liars’ Paradox: “This sentence is false.”  If that 
proposition is true it is false, and if it is false, it is true.  Surely this is absurd, but that does not 
mean that the paradox can be dismissed because of its absurdity. 
123 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text. 
124 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1868. 
125 See supra note 65 and accompanying text; Coleman & Leiter, supra note 65, at 571 
(noting that the accuracy of Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein “is really beside the point . . . 
Kripke can be all wrong about Wittgenstein, but right about meaning.”). 
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case, even if Wittgenstein would not himself support Kripke’s analysis, nor does this 
mean that Kripke’s argument is without support in Philosophical Investigations.  
Wittgenstein may not have intended to reason as Kripke does, but whether his 
arguments (unintentionally) provide a means to sketch a skeptical paradox is an 
altogether different question.  As a result, the irreducibly speculative question of 
whether Wittgenstein would agree with Kripke does not concern me. 
d.  Rule-Following As a Poor Analogy to the Legal Language Game 
Insofar as Wittgenstein’s model of rule-following is determinate, it may 
analogize poorly to the legal language game.  There is serious difficulty in applying 
Wittgenstein’s language-as-practice analysis to law.126  “[T]he arguments 
Wittgenstein uses to establish his alternative to a rule-based account of language, 
which justifies itself as practice and does not require interpretation, cannot easily be 
made to work in law.”127  The difficulties arise upon examination of two 
characteristics of Wittgenstein’s theory: the notion of consensus and disagreement 
and the concept of justification. 
The importance of consensus to the concept of rule determinacy cannot be 
overstated.  As previously discussed, it is the community consensus that renders 
determinate the application of a rule, according to both the anti-Kripkeans and to 
Kripke himself (and to supporters of Kripke, such as Professor Radin).128  It is the 
community’s agreement on what counts as an application of a given rule that enables 
individuals to judge an application as conforming or deviating from the rule.129  “[I]t 
is the community’s agreement in judgments (rather than the logical power of rules) 
that makes our practices stable and immune from skeptical doubt.”130   
However, what happens where the community has substantial disagreement (as 
opposed to minor differences of opinion) as to the application of a rule? After all, 
“Wittgenstein uses examples of rule following where there is no disagreement about 
how to go on in new cases.  In fact, his examples are all ones in which there would 
be immediate agreement about which response was correct.”131  The notion of 
consensus seems to have at its core that “[w]e can judge the skeptic as wrong 
because he or she is radically out of step with our way of doing things.  However, if 
there is substantial disagreement within the community already, this type of 
correctness judgment is impossible.”132  Even some of the anti-Kripkeans submit that 
consensus is a sine qua non for rule determinacy, “[i]t is far from inevitable that all 
                                                                
126 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1871 (“Problems arise when we consider the 
difference between applying Wittgenstein’s methodology to language or mathematics and 
applying it to law.”); see also Bruce A. Markell, Bewitched by Language: Wittgenstein and the 
Practice of Law, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 801 (2005) (arguing that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
cannot properly be used to solve specific legal problems). 
127 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1872. 
128 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
129 KRIPKE, supra note 63, at 111-12. 
130 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1873. 
131 Id. at 1872 (footnotes omitted). 
132 Id. at 1873.   
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persons will always react in all matters in the same way; where we do not go on the 
same way there will simply be no stable practice.”133 
To illustrate this point further, consider the game of baseball.  The consensus 
argument holds that we do not require a batter to explain how his swinging of the bat 
counts as an application of the rule for a “strike.”  It is true that if one batter dropped 
his bat, produced a football, hurled it into the outfield and began tearing around the 
bases, the community of baseball players and watchers would have no problem 
labeling the batter’s actions as deviant from the rules of baseball.  However, if every 
baseball player suddenly dropped his bat, hurled a football into the outfield and 
began tearing around the bases, we might eventually have a new game instead of a 
case of a rather odd deviation from the rule.  But what if only some players throw 
their footballs and others use their bats in the traditional sense? It is not at all clear to 
me what the rules of this amalgamated game are, or, more importantly, whether a 
particular player’s behavior conforms to the rule.134  Justice Scalia himself observed 
this same phenomenon in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin when he noted, “I suppose there 
is some point at which the rules of a well-known game are changed to such a degree 
that no reasonable person would call it the same game.”135  On this point, Justice 
Scalia is exactly correct. 
Questions of how to interpret the Constitution hardly attain a consensus within 
the community.136  Many reject the textualism-originalism hermeneutic for numerous 
reasons.  When there is substantial disagreement within the legal community 
regarding whether textualism-originalism is a desirable or even coherent interpretive 
methodology, this lack of consensus seriously obstructs even a “skeptical solution” 
                                                                
133 Bix, supra note 6, at 112. 
134 See David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article 
V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21 (1990) (citing DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 213 (1984)).  
Professor Dow discusses the notion of “empty questions” as explained by Derek Parfit: “There 
are cases in which what we recognize is all there is; there is nothing additional to which we 
can resort.”  Id.  In such a case, to question the legitimacy of the proposition or belief is an 
empty question.  There is no “deeper fact that would settle the matter.”  Id. (citing DANIEL 
DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 41 (1987)).  When there is substantial community 
disagreement, the notion of rule determinacy or coherence is questionable at best, because 
there is no deeper fact that settles what game the athletes are actually playing.  The reply I am 
sketching here agrees with Professor Dow and Professor Parfit, but extends the analysis 
further: what happens when the community is unsure what it recognizes or, more precisely, 
recognizes nothing at all?  Without this recognition, without the community consensus, rule 
skepticism seems to return with a vengeance.  This is because absent community consensus, 
there is no recourse for determining whether a putative application of the rule actually 
conforms to the rule.  Under the anti-skeptical view of Wittgenstein, he might well agree with 
Parfit that requiring a logical connection between the rule for “strike” and the batter’s conduct 
is just such an empty question.  My point is that where recognition and consensus break down, 
rule skepticism again comes into play, no pun intended. 
135 PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
136 Arulanantham points out that “the legal system has been designed with a recognition 
that disputes are inevitable (hence appellate review, preclusion law designed to minimize 
inconsistent judgments, etc.).  Thus, a certain level of disagreement is recognized as an 
inevitable part of the legal framework.”  Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1873.  Thus, the 
extent to which there is community consensus on many legal issues is questionable.  
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to rule indeterminacy.  In short, I do not believe that the legal community has 
grounded textualism-originalism in its practice to the extent that asking whether 
textualism-originalism is applied consistently is to ask an empty question.137  Where 
there is no consensus on the utility of textualism-originalism, it becomes impossible 
to “judge the skeptic as wrong because he or she is radically out of step with our way 
of doing things.”  Consensus is what establishes ‘our way of doing things.’  If the 
community’s practice is unclear, and if there is substantial disagreement as to the 
practice, then the standard for evaluating the skeptic’s conduct itself becomes vague 
and indecipherable.  As such, Arulanantham maintains that  “Wittgenstein’s account 
of how we follow a rule cannot be applied to contexts where there is substantial 
disagreement.”138  Even anti-skeptics agree.  Brian Bix explains that “law is a 
reflective activity: the participants consider, discuss and argue over how they should 
go on.  Contrary to Wittgenstein's descriptions of mathematicians and mathematical 
series, disputes do break out in law over the question of whether a rule has been 
obeyed or not.”139 
I do not mean to oversimplify.  Obviously, there may be substantial disagreement 
about various and sundry mathematical problems.  But, I daresay, there is 
comparatively little dissent concerning what counts as application of the rule of 
addition.  To be sure, there may be disagreement on the answer, but far less so on 
whether the mathematician has actually applied the rule of addition (as opposed to 
“quaddition”).  Wittgenstein’s examples of rule-following take this form—where 
there would be little disagreement about whether a particular interpretation conforms 
to the rule.  In a game where there is little, if any, consensus as to whether a given 
interpretation conforms to the rule—such as whether a specific constitutional 
interpretation conforms to the meta-rule of textualism-originalism—the ability to 
judge the skeptic as deviant diminishes. 
                                                                
137 See supra note 134; see also Posner, supra note 11, at 859 (“Either there is a strong 
political or ethical consensus and it penetrates and shapes legal doctrine, or there is not—and a 
fragmented political and ethical discourse will no more yield determinative outcomes than 
legal reasoning will.”).  As Professor Bix explains: 
I am not sure that there is a bright line between those “easy cases” that fit under the 
rubric of Wittgenstein-on-rule-following and those that do not.  That is, I am not sure 
that a theorist can usually (if ever) be confident in determining which interpretation 
questions are completely beyond the pale of legitimate debate (“outside the language 
game”). 
Bix, supra note 6, at 113. 
138 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1873.  Arulanantham also cites Simon Blackburn for 
support:  
For Wittgenstein is taken to teach us that . . . coming adrift, that is going wrong in a 
new application of an old term, is not a matter of jumping pre-existent Platonic rails 
determining which way one ought to go, for there can be no such things.  It is a matter 
of getting out of step, of having an organism that whirls differently from the others.  
Suppose this is true.  If that is the kind of way to see judgments of inconsistency . . . 
then it follows that they cannot be made when . . . there is no consensus to serve as a 
background upon which they are based. 
Id. (citing Simon Blackburn, Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism, in WITTGENSTEIN: 
TO FOLLOW A RULE 172 (Stephen H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981)). 
139 Bix, supra note 6, at 115. 
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The second reason Wittgenstein’s analysis of language-as-practice may correlate 
poorly to law is because law is an enterprise that requires justification.  “Perhaps the 
central distinctive feature of the legal language game, at least when compared with 
Wittgenstein’s examples from simple mathematics and everyday language use, 
concerns the need to provide justifications for why legal decisions come out the way 
they do.”140  The thrust of Wittgenstein’s argument, if the anti-skeptics are correct, is 
that justification is not required in applying, for example, an arithmetic rule: “[w]hen 
someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue the series, I act quickly, with 
perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons does not trouble me.”141  “Thus, 
Wittgenstein says there is a sort of behavior for which we do not need the kinds of 
reasons the skeptic demands because we can behave without explanation.  
Furthermore, when faced with a skeptic who demands reasons in such situations, we 
are unable to provide them.”142  This inability is what Parfit calls an empty 
question.143  The question is empty because one is unable to provide any answer to 
the skeptic as to why the rule for addition is being applied—and no answer is needed 
according to this reading of Wittgenstein.144 
In contrast, the legal enterprise is founded on the need for justification.  As 
Dewey noted, “[c]ourts not only reach decisions; they expound them, and the 
exposition must state justifying reasons.”145  A legal decision sans justifications is 
regarded as arbitrary and likely of poor precedential value.  Dewey articulates that 
the purpose of exposition “is to set forth grounds for the decision reached so that it 
will not appear as an arbitrary dictum, and so that it will indicate a rule for dealing 
with similar cases in the future.”146  Where law as a process requires justifications as 
a fundamental component of legal method in contrast to, for example, the application 
of an arithmetic rule to a particular problem, the extent to which Wittgenstein’s 
analysis can be appropriately analogized to law is dubious. 
In law, however, most legal theorists and judges would want to provide 
more . . . when asked to justify their account of what constitutes the 
correct following of a legal rule.  Unlike Wittgenstein’s examples, those 
analyzing judicial decisions do typically demand explanations and reasons 
for those decisions (whereas, on Wittgenstein’s view, only misguided 
                                                                
140 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1877. 
141 Id. (citing WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 90, at § 212). 
142 Id. 
143See supra note 134; see also Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1877-78 (“When faced 
with a skeptic like the one imagined by Wittgenstein, we eventually have nothing to say, and 
nothing to point to, that could justify our continuation of the mathematical series in a way that 
would satisfy him.”).  This “nothing to say” is what renders the question empty, as Professor 
Dow describes Parfit’s analysis. 
144 See Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1878 (“When dealing with uncontroversial 
processes like the addition rule, we never have a need for such a justification.”). 
145 Dewey, supra note 12. 
146 Id. 
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philosophers scrutinize an addition problem to see how it could be 
decided otherwise).147 
Furthermore, the fact that justification is generally required for sound legal 
method has bi-directional implications.  I previously examined the forward 
consequences: the requirement of justifications means that Wittgenstein’s position 
that our practices need no justification does not analogize well to the practice of 
law.148  Additionally, and somewhat ironically, the justification requisite is what 
prompted the need for logical connections between an antecedent rule and concrete 
subject-matter for individual cases.  Dewey explains that “[i]t is highly probable that 
the need of justifying to others conclusions reached and decisions made has been the 
chief cause of the origin and development of logical operations in the precise sense; 
of abstraction, generalization, regard for consistency of implications.”149  Thus, the 
requirement for justification not only results in a disconnect between Wittgenstein’s 
allegedly anti-skeptical analysis and law, but also, at least in part, contributed to the 
development of an elaborate rule-based system. 
Thus, Wittgenstein’s anti-skepticism, if he indeed rejects skepticism, analogizes 
poorly to the legal language game, if at all.  First, the legal language game—and 
more specifically, the constitutional hermeneutics game—is fraught with 
disagreement, and, in the absence of consensus, rule skepticism seems to rear its 
head.  Second, law has at its very core the requirement of justification.  To the extent 
that Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical arguments rely on circumstances in which the 
community needs no justification (for example, application of the rule for addition or 
the rule for “strike”), such tendencies seem too disparate to cogently apply to the 
law. 
In spite of the serious difficulties of applying Wittgenstein’s analysis to law or 
the legal language game, I will assume arguendo that Wittgenstein’s anti-skepticism 
is valid and applicable to law.150  Even under this assumption, textualism-originalism 
is not saved.  If the language-as-practice analysis is correct, it may prevent rule 
indeterminacy, but it does not save the textualism-originalism hermeneutic. 
                                                                
147 Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1878; see also Bix, supra note 6, at 114-15 (rejecting 
Brian Langile's attempts to move from the “grammar of language” to the “grammar of law,” 
and implying that law, unlike basic mathematics, is in need of “further justification”). 
148 Arulanantham explains that  
a simple attempt to apply the Wittgensteinian formula for determinacy in mathematics 
and language straightforwardly to the legal context is doomed to failure.  Correctness 
in law must be different from correctness in mathematics or language because in law 
one must provide a justification that explains why a particular outcome is correct and 
that goes beyond merely stating that it is the way things are done. 
Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1878. 
149 Dewey, supra note 12, at 24. 
150 At least one anti-skeptic, however, views such an effort as erroneous.  Bix, while 
rejecting the skeptical analysis, nevertheless also rejects an attempt to use Wittgenstein's 
analysis to ground assurance in law and rule determinacy: “The over-reading danger occurs 
when Wittgenstein's message is interpreted as guaranteeing ascriptions of correctness or the 
achievement of consensus in more controversial matters.”  Bix, supra note 6, at 113. 
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4.  Incoherence of Textualism and Originalism Aside from Kripke 
Even assuming Kripke is wrong, textualism and originalism are not saved from 
incoherence.  Why?  The traditional model of rule-following provides that rules 
determine outcomes.151  This is even more crucial for textualism-originalism because 
its avowed purpose is to constrain judicial policy-making.152  The anti-skeptical 
argument indicates that it is our practices that guide our rules rather than our rules 
that guide our practices.  This point deserves explanation.  The language-as-practice 
analysis instructs that we do not apply the rule for addition or the rule for “strike” 
determinately because of any logical connection between an antecedent rule and a 
particular application.  Rather, determinacy exists because the community agrees that 
particular applications instantiate the rule at issue and that such actions require no 
justification to ground meaning. 
But our rules do not come prior to our practices even under the anti-skeptical 
view.  Consider the baseball analogy again.  The reason the rule for “strike” coheres 
is assuredly not, according to this reading of Wittgenstein, because Abner Doubleday 
or Major League Baseball created such a rule years ago.  This is precisely backwards 
and is what the skeptical paradox derails.153  Instead, the rule is meaningful because 
baseball players and umpires, as a practice, behave in ways that set “community” 
standards for what is and is not a strike.  If umpires and players suddenly decided by 
consensus that curveballs may never be strikes, then the rules of the game have 
changed, regardless of what Abner Doubleday had set forth as the antecedent rules of 
baseball years ago. 
The consequence for textualism-originalism, however, is that it cannot possibly 
constrain interpretation because, as a meta-rule, it does not exist antecedent to the 
practice of judicial resolution.  It is the practice of judicial resolution that determines 
what our rules are.  It only makes sense to obey a rule where it is community practice 
to obey that rule.  It is community practice to apply the rule for addition instead of 
quaddition, or “strike” in a baseball game instead of “quike.”  However, it is not 
community practice to apply textualism-originalism, and in any case, this meta-rule 
does not exist antecedent to our practices.   
If it arises anywhere, the textualism-originalism hermeneutic arises out of 
community (in this case, the judicial community) practice.  Of course, a core element 
of judicial practice is interpretation and, to a lesser extent, constitutional 
interpretation (lesser in frequency, but not in importance).  The result is that the 
process of interpreting the Constitution is what grounds or determines or warrants 
(for Kripke) our assertion that a particular interpretation accords with textualism-
originalism.154  Under Wittgenstein’s language-as-practice analysis, it is assuredly 
                                                                
151 See supra Part III. 
152 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
153 Indeed, this is the familiar rule-based theory of meaning.  According to this view, the 
rules (for strike) uniquely determine, by themselves, the correct applications.  There is a 
logical connection between the rule for “strike” and any given correct interpretation.  This is 
what many scholars, even the anti-skeptics, agree that Wittgenstein rejects as incoherent.  See 
supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
154 See Bix, supra note 6, at 109 (explaining that Wittgenstein “would not have endorsed 
[the proposition that] language can be understood separate from its applications”). 
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not the case that a logical connection from the textualism-originalism meta-rule 
dictates any particular interpretation.  The rule is apparent in the practice; the rule 
does not determine the practice.155  Under the anti-skeptical reading of Wittgenstein, 
it is the search for the logical connection between the rule and the “correct” 
interpretation that is quixotic.  Accordingly, textualism-originalism could not, purely 
as a meta-rule, constrain a judge’s decisions.  The meta-rule simply does not and 
could not determine the practice.156 
In other words, because the meta-rule by itself cannot determine the correct 
application, the textualism-originalism hermeneutic simply does not and cannot 
determine the correct decision.  More importantly, even if rules are determinate by 
reference to the praxis of language, the “correct” result does not stem from the rule 
itself—thus textualism-originalism hardly serves to constrain interpretation. 
John Dewey’s analysis dovetails with the argument I have sketched above.  
Dewey speaks primarily to what he sees as the chief fallacy of legal formalism: the 
emphasis on antecedent rules.  As should be plain, my contention that the notion of 
antecedent rules that determine outcomes holds little weight with even an anti-
skeptical Wittgenstein converges with Dewey’s analysis.  Accordingly, I will begin 
Part V, which details my answer to Professor Cohen’s question, my position on how 
judges actually decide cases,157 by sketching Dewey’s argument. 
V.  MY PERSPECTIVE ON PROFESSOR COHEN’S QUESTION:  
HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE CASES? 
A.  Dewey’s Rejection of Antecedent Rules 
As previously noted, the model of judicial resolution that formalists (and, I argue, 
textualists and originalists) espouse is: rule → facts → decision.  There is a prior rule 
to which judges apply the facts of the case, which directs judges to the conclusion.  
Or, in the case of textualism-originalism, the judge applies the rule that directs the 
interpretation of the substrate text, which in turn directs the rule of decision.  The key 
is that the rule, or meta-rule, is antecedent to the application of the concrete subject-
matter.  I have suggested one argument for repudiating this model.  Dewey also 
rejects this notion.  He reasons that, “as a matter of actual fact, we generally begin 
with some vague anticipation of a conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), 
and then we look around for principles and data which will substantiate it.”158 
                                                                
155 See Arulanantham, supra note 83, at 1876 (“We must look at the way the concept is 
used in order to determine how we define it, rather than bringing a pre-formed notion of what 
counts as a definition and then applying it to the working concept itself.”). 
156 See Marmor, supra note 89, at 73 (“Indeed, no sense can be given to the idea that a rule 
contains its own application, as it were.”). 
157 I have hitherto only been concerned with explaining my opinion on how judges do not 
decide cases.  Namely, judges do not decide cases by applying antecedent rules, including 
meta-rules on how to interpret text, to concrete subject-matter. 
158 Dewey, supra note 12, at 23. 
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Therefore, one might visualize Dewey’s model of judicial resolution as: facts → 
decision → rule.159  I maintain that Wittgenstein would endorse this view, at least 
insofar as the rule only arises through the practice of decisionmaking.  It does not 
exist antecedent to the application of concrete subject-matter (the “facts” of the legal 
language game).  Dewey notes that “men do not begin thinking with premises . . . . 
Premises only gradually emerge from analysis of the total situation.”160  The notion 
that premises only emerge after analyzing the circumstances further substantiates the 
concept that rules do not exist logically prior to consideration of the facts.  Inasmuch 
as the major premise is a legal rule or meta-rule, such as “all men are mortal,” 
Dewey’s analysis instructs that individuals actually begin with such rules in the 
process of legal analysis. 
No lawyer ever thought out the case of a client in terms of the syllogism.  
He begins with a conclusion which he intends to reach, favorable to his 
client of course, and then analyzes the facts of the situation to find 
material out of which to construct a favorable statement of facts, to form a 
minor premise.161 
Dewey’s observation here is that even the lawyer does not use the formalist model 
(my point is that the judge certainly does not).  Rather, the lawyer begins with a 
conclusion and works backwards to ascertain an appropriate minor premise.  
Dewey’s model can be encapsulated in a single sentence that is consistent with my 
argument: the logic of judicial decisions “must be a logic relative to consequences 
rather than to antecedents . . . .”162 
It is important to observe that the model I attribute to Dewey is static.  That is, it 
only applies to a discrete case before a judge.  Judicial decisionmaking is a dynamic 
process.  Each individual decision is not a discrete event in isolation from the 
numerous decisions of higher or equivalent courts of authority.163  The judge might 
ask: “What is the relationship of the rule to case 2 or case 10?”  One might argue that 
by the time case 10 comes around, one has a ready-made an antecedent rule that can 
be applied, particularly if the facts are indistinguishable.164  The argument continues 
                                                                
159 Of course, as Judge Posner notes, a judge takes into account much more than the 
simple facts of the case in reaching a decision.  See Posner, supra note 11 at 872-73.  
Numerous policy, ethical, and even intuitional considerations combine to aid a judge in 
reaching a decision.  Id.  The process sketched above is thus vastly oversimplified, but not, I 
daresay, inaccurate.  In any case, the key point of Dewey’s model is that the rule is not 
antecedent to the decision: “The ‘universal’ stated in the major premise is not outside of and 
antecedent to particular cases . . . .”  Dewey, supra note 12, at 22. 
160 Dewey, supra note 12, at 23. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 26. 
163 See Marmor, supra note 89, at 77 (“Wittgenstein's emphasis here is on the multiplicity 
of the occasions for use . . . .”). 
164 I might pause here to note that I am dubious that any two events are really 
indistinguishable, in a metaphysical sense.  It is my contention that facts of different cases are 
almost always distinguishable.  See, e.g., Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in 
Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 665, 772 (1999) (“[T]he vast majority of cases can be distinguished from other 
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that it makes little sense to speak of rules as only following practices—one can make 
up a rule and then follow it.  Surely, then, rules may be antecedent to practices. 
While I agree that one can make up a rule antecedent to a given practice, I 
daresay that the dynamic process of “creating” and applying rules in the legal 
language game is somewhat more complicated than making a rule such as “I will rise 
at 6 a.m. every Monday morning for the next year.”  However, the thrust of this note 
is not on the creation of legal rules but rather the process by which rules are 
followed.  Rules do not meaningfully exist antecedent to practices because it is our 
practices that give birth to our rules.165  The fact that rules do not meaningfully exist 
outside of practices does not mean that rules cannot be invented outside of practices.  
I believe that Wittgenstein would agree that one can create a rule antecedent to a 
given game.  However, the insight is that the continued existence of that rule in that 
game is predicated on community practice.166  The authority of the rule, indeed its 
very existence, is contingent on practice. 
Abner Doubleday may have set forth the rules of baseball in the late 19th century, 
but the meaning and content of those rules are wholly supplied by the baseball 
community and the by the players’ and umpires’ actual practices.  I may well make 
up a rule, but what gives content to that rule, what grounds or warrants its meaning 
and existence, is how the rule is followed in practice.  Thus, the point is not whether 
one can invent a rule antecedent to a practice.  Rather, for both Dewey and myself, 
the point is that the practice of judicial decisionmaking does not follow a formalist 
model in which prior rules constrain and produce subsequent decisions.  The key is 
this: rules are not followed in the ways that the formalist model suggests. 
This phenomenon changes little from case 1 to case 10.  By case 10, the contours 
of the general principle(s) that may be relevant are better defined than in case 1.  
However, in either case, the rule or meta-rule simply does not produce or constrain a 
decision.  There may be a rule, but the rule itself never determines or produces the 
correct application of that rule no matter how its contours are defined.  This is the 
fallacy of the textualism-originalism hermeneutic: its efficacy is predicated on its 
ability, in and of itself, to constrain interpretation.167  Even under the anti-skeptical 
reading of Wittgenstein, a rule cannot do this by itself, whether the rule comes from 
case 1 or case 100. 
In my opinion, no meta-rule determines the result of any particular case.  This, of 
course, does not mean that rules are empty or meaningless for, inter alia, the reasons 
articulated by Kripke.168  To the extent that a textualist-originalist relies on a meta-
rule alone to constrain interpretation, the reliance is misplaced.  Judges do not decide 
cases solely on the basis of rules or meta-rules that constrain interpretation.  As 
Dewey observed, general principles may emerge from the treatment of cases; 
                                                           
similar cases, at least to some degree.”).  But, I will assume arguendo cases exist in which no 
judge could ever distinguish the facts. 
165 See supra Part IV.B.4; see also Dewey, supra note 12, at 22 (“We find that general 
principles emerge as statements of generic ways in which it has been found helpful to treat 
concrete cases . . . .”). 
166 See supra Part IV.B.4.  
167 See supra Part III. 
168 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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however, this is a far cry from signifying that these principles or rules constrain 
interpretation in the way textualism-originalism is meant to.  Rules are contingent on 
practices—they do not meaningfully exist antecedent to the application of concrete 
subject-matter, which occurs in the decision process. 
B.  The Pragmatic Model of Decisionmaking 
John Dewey is one of the great pragmatists in American legal history.169  Chief 
Judge Richard Posner espouses a similarly pragmatic model in his 1989 article, The 
Jurisprudence of Skepticism.170  In his article, Chief Judge Posner articulates his 
vision of how judges actually decide cases, his answer to Professor Cohen’s 
question.  He does not view all rules as indeterminate, as I do.  However, Chief 
Judge Posner does challenge the “overblown rhetoric (which is still very common 
among judges at all levels . . . ) about the power of legal reasoning to yield 
demonstrably correct answers to difficult legal questions . . . .”171  His contention is 
that legal reasoning is “for the most part a branch of practical reason.”172  For Chief 
Judge Posner, it is not a matter of applying the appropriate rule or meta-rule, which 
will then produce the “correct” result; indeed, he rejects the “power of legal 
reasoning to generate determinate outcomes.”173     
Wittgenstein himself might have agreed with Chief Judge Posner’s analysis that 
“the law is not a thing [judges] discover; it is the name of their activity.  They do not 
act in accordance with something called ‘law’, they just act . . . .”174  This view is 
entirely consistent with Wittgenstein’s language-as-game analysis.  Rules of law do 
not exist antecedent to a question presented; they are not something to which a judge 
can apply a rule of interpretation and ascertain an answer.  Rather, the judge simply 
acts, as the baseball player swings, as the adder adds, all in accordance with the anti-
skeptical reading of Wittgenstein.  The key is that even under this reading, rules of 
                                                                
169 See Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 25 
(1996) (locating Dewey among the great American pragmatist legal scholars). 
170 Posner, supra note 11. 
171 Id. at 858. 
172 Id. at 859; see also Dewey, supra note 12, at 25.  Dewey argues that practical certainty 
is an attainable and desirable goal of the law.  He differentiates “theoretical certainty and 
practical certainty” by reasoning that the former is sought by the formalists, while the latter 
simply embodies “the reasonable proposition that judicial decisions should possess the 
maximum possible regularity . . . .”  Id.  Dewey does maintain that rules of interpretation aid 
in reaching practical certainty—but he is quick to add that “principles of interpretation do not 
signify rules so rigid that they can be stated once and for all and then be literally and 
mechanically adhered to.”  Id.  This is not necessarily inconsistent with my analysis.  Though 
my strong thesis is that all rules are inherently indeterminate, the weak thesis posits that rules 
and meta-rules may be determinate and even useful.  However, even in the latter case, meta-
rules in particular do not definitively constrain interpretation.  They could not do so because 
they do not exist meaningfully as an antecedent.  In any case, even if Dewey’s belief in the 
utility of meta-rules is in tension with my view, that only signifies that Dewey and I do not 
agree on every detail.  I daresay his vision—that judges do not decide cases based on 
antecedent rules—meshes with my argument sufficiently to provide support. 
173 Posner, supra note 11, at 859. 
174 Id. at 881 (footnote omitted). 
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interpretation do not constrain a judge’s decision as to a particular question 
presented.  A judge acts according to an amalgam of precedent, social policy 
considerations, and ethical considerations.175  A rule does not produce a given 
outcome; a meta-rule does not constrain interpretation.  Chief Judge Posner makes 
this quite clear: 
The fact that a position cannot be shown to be correct does not mean that 
it is the product of impulse or meanness.  The position may reflect a social 
vision that can be articulated and defended even though it cannot be 
proved right or wrong.  Few ethical propositions—almost none that 
people are interested in debating—can be proved right or wrong, yet 
ethical discourse is not fruitless; and in indeterminate cases legal 
discourse is a form of ethical or political discourse.176 
Following (or more precisely, preceding) Dewey’s and Posner’s logic, yet 
another famous pragmatist, William James, observed that law is a result.177  James 
also discerned the fallacy of the formalist model:  
Common-law judges sometimes talk about the law, and schoolmasters 
talk about the [L]atin tongue, in a way to make their hearers think they 
mean entities pre-existent to the decisions or to the words and the syntax, 
determining them unequivocally and requiring them to obey.178 
This is precisely the model I am criticizing as well.  Taking its place is a more 
accurate description of the way judges actually decide cases. 
It will come as no surprise to the careful reader that the positive model I 
endorse179 is sympathetic to pragmatism.  Of course, Dewey and James are famous 
and avowed pragmatists, and though Chief Judge Posner’s article is entitled The 
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, he also acknowledges the pragmatic color of his 
reasoning.180 
                                                                
175 See id. at 863 (opining that legal analysis is “a form of policy analysis”).  Chief Judge 
Posner notes throughout the article that judges often decide cases based on policy and ethical 
considerations.  See, id. at 872-73 (“[B]ecause policy and ethical considerations are 
permissible elements of decision in our judicial culture, the judge may lack a distinct sense of 
where legal reasoning leaves off and policy judgment or social vision . . . begins.”). 
176 Id. at 874.  Chief Judge Posner’s analysis supports my belief, a full exposition of which 
is beyond the scope of this paper, that rule indeterminacy is not equivalent to semantic 
nihilism.  Even in a world in which rules are radically indeterminate, meaning is still possible. 
177 WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 93 (Thomas Crofts & Phillip Smith eds., Dover 
Publications Inc. 1995) (1907). 
178 Id. at 92. 
179 It must be stressed that I do not endorse this model because I normatively believe it is 
the most proper.  That is beside the point.  Rather, I endorse this model because I believe it 
accurately describes the way judges decide cases.  Textualism and originalism are incoherent 
in terms of their avowed purposes—they simply cannot constrain interpretation in the formal 
way that its proponents assert it does.  Judges could not possibly decide cases solely on the 
basis of the textualist-originalist meta-rule.   
180 Posner, supra note 11, at 866 (explaining that his “ontological skepticism” about law 
“emerges naturally from the pragmaticism of a Charles Peirce”); see also Grey, supra note 
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James argued that one of the merits of pragmatism was its rigorously empirical 
focus.  “No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of orientation, is what 
the pragmatic method means.  The attitude of looking away from first things, 
principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, 
consequences, facts.”181  The empirical slant of pragmatism is beneficial inasmuch as 
it steers individuals away from purely abstract formal thought.  However, the 
benefits stem from the notion that formalism does not accurately describe the ways 
individuals interact with the world.  James invites his readers to “imagine a youth in 
a courtroom trying cases with an abstract notion of ‘the’ law . . . .  What progress 
[does he] make?”182  
James doubts that any real progress will be made, and in explaining himself, he 
sketches a method closely analogous to my own answer to Professor Cohen’s 
question: “[Truth, law, and language] make themselves as we go.  Our rights, 
wrongs, prohibitions, penalties, words, forms, idioms, beliefs, are so many creations 
that add themselves as fast as history proceeds.  Far from being antecedent 
principles that animate the process, law, language, truth are but abstract names for 
its results.”183 
The notion that law “makes itself” is consistent with the Wittgensteinian notion 
of language as a practice.  The law is the name of the activity that judges perform; it 
is experiential, as would be expected from a model with pragmatic tendencies.  The 
law is not a set of “antecedent principles that animate the process.”184  According to 
the pragmatist model of decisionmaking, judges assuredly generate policy.  To judge 
is to make policy, because the law itself is the name of the practice and the process 
of judicial decisionmaking.  The law is a result; it is the name of the activity judges 
perform rather than any set of principles that serve to constrain interpretation in and 
of themselves.  It is born in the stream of experience, as Justice Holmes suggested.185 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to demonstrate why textualism-originalism cannot possibly 
accomplish the tasks that one of its notable adherents, Justice Scalia, has expressly 
set forth.186  For a legal formalist like Justice Scalia, the formula rule →  facts →  
decision captures a vital feature of constitutional hermeneutics: it constrains 
interpretation.187 
                                                           
169, at 25 (stating that Posner thinks of himself “as a jurisprudential follower[] of James and 
Dewey”). 
181 JAMES, supra note 177, at 22; see also Dewey, supra note 12, at 26 (“logic relative to 
consequences”).  JAMES also notes that “[p]ragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts.”  
JAMES, supra note 177, at 26. 
182 Id. at 93. 
183 Id. at 93 (second emphasis added). 
184 Id. 
185 See supra note 14. 
186 See supra Part III. 
187 See id. 
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In my opinion, the problem is that neither rules nor meta-rules can constrain 
interpretation.  And it is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that structures my 
critique, which is comprised of both strong and weak theses. 
The strong thesis, as sketched by Kripke’s analysis of the skeptical paradox of 
meaning, is that rules are radically and hopelessly indeterminate.188  Though I am 
personally sympathetic to the notion of radical indeterminacy, I recognize that it is 
beset with a host of profound difficulties.  Though I advance the thesis, it is not my 
project here to defend such a view against all comers. 
The weak thesis, which seems to be a point upon which Kripke and the anti-
skeptics agree, is that language is defined by practice, and that the community of 
linguistic practitioners ground meaning and interpretation, such that radical 
indeterminacy does not accurately characterize the body of our experience.189  
However, it is a premise of the weak thesis that the rule by itself never determines its 
own application.190  Indeed, this is the very explanation of Wittgenstein’s 
undertaking in Philosophical Investigations that anti-skeptics like Marie McGinn 
proffer.191 
Of course, if rules cannot define appropriate applications of a rule, then their 
utility in constraining interpretation is dubious.192  This is the heart of my critique.  
Even under an anti-skeptical reading of Wittgenstein, rules alone do not constrain 
interpretation.193  Neither does the textualism-originalism hermeneutic.194  It cannot 
accomplish the objectives Justice Scalia intends it to. 
As such, I do not think the legal formalist model accurately depicts the practice 
judges engage in.  Rather, some of the great pragmatists of the past century, such as 
Dewey and James, supply a model of legal practice that is both more accurate and 
more faithful to the Wittgensteinian critique I have attempted to sketch here.195  The 
pragmatic model of judicial decisionmaking can be conceptualized as facts → 
decision → rule.  Rules are the results of our practice.196  As Chief Judge Posner 
explains, this is why the law is the name of an activity.197  The law, so to speak, is a 
result.  Insofar as the practice of following the specific rule gives the rule its 
meaning, legal rules arise out of that practice rather than existing antecedently.  It is 
just as Justice Holmes explained so many years ago: “the life of the law is not logic, 
it is experience.”198 
                                                                
188 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
189 See supra Part IV.B.3. 
190 Id. 
191 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra Part IV.B.4. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See supra Part V. 
196 See, e.g., note 181 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
198 See HOLMES, supra note 15, at 1. 
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